A secular Berber, pro-Western, nation is born in the middle of Sahara.
Azawad is certainly entitled to be a free nation. It is an almost homogeneous Muslim and Berber-speaking society : an offshoot of the larger Touareg confederacy that controlled most of the Sahara and its commercial trade routes for centuries if not millenia. In the early 1900’s, the French amalgamated it for adminitrative purposes with Sudan, a black-populated colony on the Niger river ; but they did not interfere much with its distinctive way of life (Touareg nomads are known to dress in blue and wear a veil ; whereas Touareg women are veil-free). Things changed in 1960, when French Sudan was granted independence as the Republic of Mali. The Azawadians insisted for a separate State. They rebelled against Mali in 1963, only to be crushed mercilessly by Malian forces. They rebelled again in 1990, a bit more successfully ; and then again in 2006 and 2010.
Now, can Azawad endure as a State ?
In military terms, the MNLA’s present superiority can be easily reversed. The stockpile from Libya will not last forever. The Malian forces may be reorganized and get new armaments. Foreign countries may send troops or « advisors » to help suppressing the secession.
In terms of international law, Azawad is hardly better off : the very fondation of African regional order is the immutability of the former colonial entities and borders, however arbitrary or absurd they may be. Still, many of the postcolonial States have been collapsing or desintegrating in the recent years, Libya being just the latest case. And in one instance – South Sudan in 2011 -, a rebel nation succeeded in securing its independence de jure, with the full backing of the international community.
Evidently, Azawad would like to make use of that precedent. The new country insists, in its declararation of independence that it recognizes all existing borders and countries, including Mali proper, which would be left with an 800 000 square kilometers area and some 13 million inhabitants. It also insists that it adheres to the UN charter and principles.
Finally, is MNLA as much in control of Azawad as it claims to be ? Two other rebel organizations operate in the area. Whereas MNLA resorts to a purely secular brand of Berber and Touareg nationalism, Ansar Dine (« The Fighters for Religion ») combines Touareg insurgency with radical Islam. The second group, AQIM (Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb), it is clearly linked to the global jihadist networks.
MNLA has taken so far a conciliatory attitude towards Ansar Dine, who is based on the powerful Ifora tribe in Southern Azawad, and whose leader, Iyad Ag Gheli, played an important role in the 1990 uprising. The two groups have actually coordinated their moves and tactics in the conquest of Gao and Timbuktu on April 1st. Yet the differences between them are startling. They don’t hoist the same flag : the MNLA banner is green, red and black with a yellow triange, Ansar Dine’s is plain black with Quranic verses in white ; MNLA leaders and officials speak Berber and French, Ansar Dine speaks Arabic ; MNLA is drawing a Western-style secular democratic constitution, Ansar Dine advocates for Sharia rule.
For the time being, MNLA is focused on AQIM, which it characterizes as an interloping non-Touareg element and an Algerian proxy. The MNLA leadership vows to crush it as soon as possible. If not « within days ».
Ever since the 1960’s, the Arab States in North Africa have attempted to seize chunks of the Sahara desert – and its mineral resources : oil, natural gas, uranium, gold, bauxite, phosphates. Morocco tried to annex Mauritania and then occupied the former Spanish colony of Rio de Oro (known now as Western Sahara). Gaddafi’s Libya was constantly interfering in Mali, Niger and Chad. Algeria, already in control, of the northern half of the area thanks to colonial France, has steadily claimed paramountcy over the southern half countries : either by countering Morocco in Western Sahara or by undermining the existing governments in other places.
For a while, Algeria contended its primary concern was to fight radical islam and to eradicate drugs trafficking. As of today, the Algerian secret services seem to be aligned with both.
The core of AQIM consists of former Algerian jihadists that were pardoned by the Algerian government on the condition that they propagate radical islam and terrorism in foreign countries. They were reinforced by volunteers or mercenaries from Arab countries and Subsaharan African countries (like Burkina Fasso or Nigeria).
Clearly, AQIM’s strategy is to entice Ansar Dine to turn against MNLA. For Algeria, the creation of a fully independent Berber State on its Southern border is a major threat, not just against its imperial designs on Sahara, but against its own existence as an Arab-Islamic nation. Half of the Algerian population is Berber-speaking. One province, Kabylia, is completely berber and has started the process of secession. A Kabyle provisional government in exile – the strongly pro-Western Anavad – was even formed last year. The consolidation of Azawad may initiate a domino effect.
On the other hand, the nastier Algeria gets with MNLA, the closer MNLA gets to the Kabyles. Azawad owes at least part of its secular and law oriented agenda to them. And it agreed to take part, last month, in a pan-Berber conference in Morocco hosted by Kabyle leaders.
The French may grant some measure of help to MNLA in order to protect its subsaharan former colonies against Algeria. But only American support can guarantee Azawad’s independence. And ensure that MNLA will get rid of its jihadist competitors.
© Michel Gurfinkiel & PJMedia, 2012